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Introduction 
The public pension world has seen two innovations 
in recent years.  One is the emergence of notional 
defined contribution (NDC) plans.  The other is the 
introduction of automatic adjustment mechanisms to 
help keep pension systems solvent when the economy 
weakens.  This brief looks at the Swedish system to 
demonstrate how NDCs work and evaluates the work-
ings of the automatic adjustment mechanism in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis.    
Sweden passed reform legislation in 1994 that in-
troduced a partially-funded NDC plan.1  The arrange-
ment is conceptually similar to a defined contribution 
plan in that contributions are accumulated in indi-
vidual accounts, but different in that the accounts are 
not fully funded and may be financed entirely on a 
pay-as-you-go basis.  In this setting, the rate of return 
credited on the account assets is based on a rule rath-
er than on actual returns.  The Swedish system uses 
a notional interest rate equal to the rate of growth of 
average earnings.  However, if a calculation suggests 
a potential deficit, the notional interest rate is auto-
matically reduced through a “brake” mechanism.  The 
recent financial crisis has highlighted ways in which 
the brake mechanism could be improved.
This brief proceeds as follows.  The first section 
describes Sweden’s NDC plan.  The second describes 
the Swedish brake mechanism.  The third describes 
two problems with the current adjustment procedure: 
1) it creates the likelihood of large shocks for retir-
ees; and 2) while disadvantaging retirees, it tends to 
advantage workers.  The fourth section presents pos-
sible fixes for the current problems.  The final section 
concludes that the Swedish NDC plan could function 
more effectively with modest changes to the brake 
mechanism.
The Swedish NDC Pension
The Swedish NDC system operates as follows:
•  Workers contribute 16 percent of earnings, which 
is credited to a notional individual account.  
•  Each year the government credits each worker’s 
account with a notional interest rate, which is 
equal to the growth rate of average earnings. •  At retirement, the value of a person’s notional ac-
cumulation is converted into an annuity in a way 
that mimics actuarial principles.  The calculation 
is described in terms of an annuity divisor; each 
birth cohort and each age has a specific divisor.   
•  The account balance is for record keeping only, 
because the system does not own matching funds
invested in the financial market.  This treatment 
explains the term “notional.”    
•  Benefits in payment grow at the notional inter-
est rate minus 1.6 percent, where 1.6 percent is 
intended to represent the long-run growth of real 
wages.  With the notional interest rate equal to 
average wage growth, if real wages do grow at 1.6 
percent, benefits keep pace with inflation.  
 
The Swedish Brake 
Mechanism  
The Swedish NDC system has a brake mechanism 
that is triggered by a change in the “balance ratio.”  
The intention is to maintain sustainability while 
avoiding increases in payroll taxes that would, in turn,
lead to an eventual increase in benefits. 
The balance ratio adds the current market value 
of the buffer funds to a “contribution asset” (reflect-
ing the present value of projected contributions), and 
divides this total by a measure of pension liabilities, 
all calculated on the basis of recent data.2
               Contribution assets + Buffer funds Balance ratio =
                    Pension liabilities   
When the balance ratio is less than one, the brake 
automatically reduces the accrual rate of workers’ 
accumulations and the indexation of pensions in pay-
ment.3  These lower rates of accrual and indexation 
continue until financial balance is restored.  
If the balance ratio recovers and moves above one, 




Problems with the Brake 
Mechanism
The Swedish brake responds to a low balance ratio 
by mimicking the response to low asset returns of 
fully-funded defined contibution accounts followed by 
variable annuities; specifically, the brake reduces the 
notional interest rate credited to notional account bal-
ances and reduces the indexation of benefits in pay-
ment.  It then allows for catch-up when the balance 
is good, paralleling the funded model if the period of 
low returns was followed by a period of higher-than-
normal asset returns.  As currently constructed, the 
brake has some undesirable results.  It creates the 
likelihood of large shocks; and it can advantage work-
ers while disadvantaging retirees.     
Likelihood of Large Shocks to Retirees
The balance ratio fell below one for the first time in 
2008, calling for adjustment in 2010, reflecting lags 
in calculation and implementation.  However, the 
required adjustment was so large that the govern-
ment responded by altering the mechanism to reduce 
the initial impact on benefits in payment.  Of course, 
slower adjustment now means more adjustment 
later.5   
Potential Gains for Workers
The easiest way to understand how workers gain 
under the current mechanism is through an example.  
The worker is assumed to have 1,000 kronor in his 
account when the brake is applied, to which he adds 
100 each year.6  In years one and two, the brake inter-
est rate of 4 percent is applied, and in years three and 
four, the catch-up rate of 6 percent.  As Table 1 on the 
next page shows, 100 kronor are deposited in the ac-
count during year one, with 4 percent interest added 
at the end of the year to the initial balance plus the 
new deposit, for a total of 1,144 kronor.  In year two, 
another 100 are deposited and the brake interest rate 
of 4 percent applied to the total.  In years three and 
four, the process is identical, except that the catch-up 
rate of 6 percent is applied.  At the end of the period 
of brake and catch-up, the account balance is 1,672 
kronor.  In contrast, in the absence of the brake, a 
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return of 5 percent throughout would have produced 
a total notional balance of 1,668.  Thus, someone 
working throughout the period of brake and catch-up 
comes out ahead.  The reason is that the catch-up rate 
is applied not only to the initial balance of 1,000 but 
also to the deposits made while the brake and catch-
up were in effect. 
The gain is larger:
•  the higher are annual deposits during the period 
of brake and catch-up;
•  the longer the period of brake and catch-up, since 
the higher catch-up rate is applied to a greater 
volume of deposits during the brake and catch-up 
phases; and
•  the larger the difference between brake and catch-
up rates relative to the steady growth accrual rate.
Table 1. Example of Effect of Brake and Catch-up on Accumulation, Swedish Kronor













Initial balance 1,000 1,000
1 4% 100 1,144.0 5% 100 1,155.0
2 4 100 1,293.8 5 100 1,317.8
3 6 100 1,477.4 5 100 1,488.6
4 6 100 1,672.0 5 100 1,668.1
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Potential Losses for Retirees  
Even without the brake, benefits in payment were 
scheduled to fall by 1.3 percent in 2010 because of 
slow wage growth.  This large response was a result 
of the unfortunate use of wage growth minus 1.6 per-
cent as the index for pensions in payment, a design 
which faces pensioners with the whole year-to-year 
variation in rates of wage change.  The automatic 
brake rule would have reduced benefits in payment 
further, to 4.6 percent (Sundén, 2009, Table 2).  Since 
pensioners on average are more risk averse than 
workers, who have more ability to adjust, it would be 
better for them to bear less of the wage risk.  
Even if real wage growth were 1.6 percent, retirees 
would be harmed by the current brake procedure.  
Again, an example is useful.  The retiree is assumed 
to have a benefit of 100 prior to the operation of the 
brake.  With steady growth, the pension would have 
been indexed by 3.4 percent (nominal wage growth 
of 5 percent minus real wage growth of 1.6 percent).  
In the example, the application of the brake reduces 
indexation to 2.4 percent; the catch-up rate is 4.4 
percent.  As shown in Table 2, catch-up is complete 
in year four, and the pension, 114.3, is the same as it 
would have been with steady indexation.  However, 
as the last column shows, in each of the first three 
years the pension is lower under brake and catch-up 
than with steady indexation.  So total pension benefits 
received over the four-year period are lower.  Thus, in 
contrast with a worker, a retiree never makes up for 
earlier losses, much less comes out ahead.
Table 2. Example of Effect of Brake and Catch-up 







Index Pension Index Pension
1 2.4% 102.4 3.4% 103.4 -1.0 %
2 2.4 104.9 3.4 106.9 -2.0
3 4.4 109.5 3.4 110.5 -1.0
4 4.4 114.3 3.4 114.3 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The loss is greater:
•  the longer the period of brake and catch-up; and
•  the larger the difference between brake and catch-
up rates relative to the steady growth accrual rate.Someone who retires during the period of brake 
and catch-up faces a combination of the effects illus-
trated by Tables 1 and 2.  Though the details of who 
gains and who loses depend on a range of factors, 
the major driver is timing.  The later that retirement 
occurs during the period of brake and catch-up, the 
more the situation resembles that of the worker, so 
that the person may be a net gainer.  Conversely, 
the earlier retirement occurs, the more the situation 
resembles that of the retiree, so that the person may 
be a net loser. 
Improving the Brake
When considering ways to improve the brake, three 
central issues arise: 1) removing the gains for work-
ers; 2) reducing the losses for retirees; and 3) lower-
ing the speed of adjustment for an imbalance.
A ‘Fix’ for Workers
A straightforward solution is to have two accounts for 
workers during a period of brake and catch-up, one 
with the brake and catch-up applied, the other not.  
At the time of retirement or, if sooner, at the end of 
catch-up, each worker’s account is set to the lower of 
the two calculations so that the maximum value of 
the worker’s account is what would have happened 
without brake and catch-up.  Thus, where catch-up 
is complete, the worker’s account equals what would 
have happened with steady indexation; if catch-up 
is less than complete at retirement, the worker’s 
account may be below what it would have been with 
steady indexation.  For someone who retires during 
this period, the two separate accounts could be used 
for two separate benefit calculations, again with the 
lower of the two used to determine benefits.  The two-
account approach avoids unintended gains, with twin 
advantages: the result is desirable in itself for reasons 
of fairness; and it reduces the liabilities of the system, 
allowing the balance ratio to be higher, thus limiting 
the losses of retirees.7
Possible ‘Fixes’ for Retirees
We regard the use of wage growth rate minus 1.6 
percent as a poor design for indexing benefits in 
payment because it puts too much risk on retirees.  
Specifically, retirees face the full year-to-year varia-
tion in wage growth.  One way to reduce the risk they 
face is to use a weighted average of price change and 
wage change.8  If the increase in benefits in payment 
is based 80 percent on price change and 20 percent 
on wage change (as in Finland), retirees would bear 
some risk but less than that faced by current workers.  
With the brake applied only to the wage portion of 
the calculation, the annual impact would be smaller, 
although the brake might last longer.  Smaller shocks 
to retirees seem preferable, even if they last longer.  
A longer period also spreads the losses across more 
cohorts.
Alternatively, if the present method of indexing 
benefits in payment were retained, the brake could be 
applied to part of wage growth, rather than all of it.  
For example, during stable times, benefits in payment 
could be increased by the rate of wage growth minus 
1.6 percent, but when the brake was in effect the 
adjustment would be applied to 20 percent of wage 
growth.9
Table 3 on the next page illustrates how modified 
indexation could help.  The first four rows illustrate 
the workings of the brake with modest inflation of 
2.0 percent and real wage growth that matches the 
norm of 1.6 percent.  Benefits in payment are indexed 
by the rate of wage growth minus 1.6 percent.  Thus, 
with a balance ratio of 1.0 and wage growth of 3.6 per-
cent, benefits rise by 1.97 percent in nominal terms 
and hence remain broadly constant in real terms.  
Lower balance ratios result in lower indexation rates 
on a roughly one-for-one basis.  Therefore, when the 
balance ratio is 0.99, nominal benefits rise by 0.95 
percent; hence, real benefits fall by about 1 percent.  
With a lower balance ratio, the indexation of benefits 
in payment turns negative in nominal terms and, of 
course, more so in real terms.  Modified indexation 
moderates the declines and reduces the risk that re-
tirees face.  Thus, with a balance ratio of 0.97 percent, 
real benefits fall by 0.63 percent under the modified 
rule, compared with about 3 percent under the cur-
rent rule.  The next four lines of Table 3 illustrate the 
effect of modified indexing with lower wage growth 
(0.6 percent rather than 1.6 percent real); again, an-
nual retiree losses are reduced.  
The last line of Table 3 shows the situation in 
Sweden in 2010, based on the balance ratio in 2008, 
and illustrates what happens if low wage growth and 
a low balance ratio occur together.  It is a misreading 
to think of these events as a “perfect storm” – many 
of the factors that reduce the balance ratio also reduce 
wage growth, so that the combined effect is no ac-
cident.  The design of the brake should recognize that 
the two sets of events are correlated.  With low wage 
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growth (0.3 percent), application of the balance ratio 
of 0.97 would have reduced benefits in payment by 
4.52 percent in nominal terms and by 4.80 percent in 
real terms.  In this scenario, modified indexation still 
faces pensioners with a loss, but significantly softens 
the decline.
By itself, with a smaller reduction in benefit 
growth, modified indexation would take longer to 
restore the balance ratio.  However, the extended 
duration of adjustment would be partly offset if modi-
fied indexation were combined with the two-account 
approach, which speeds up the restoration of the bal-
ance ratio by avoiding unintended gains.


















0.99 2.00 3.60 0.95 -1.03 1.76 -0.23
















0.99 2.00 2.60 -0.03 -1.99 0.78 -1.19
















Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Reducing the Likelihood of Sharp Shocks
It is useful to have some automatic adjustment of the 
notional interest rate in the face of prospective prob-
lems of long-run sustainability.  However, as recent 
experience in Sweden has shown, the way the balance 
ratio is used can have a sharp impact on retirees.  To 
spread out the impact of a decline in the balance ratio, 
the brake could follow the suggestion of Auerbach 
and Lee and phase in the impact of the balance ratio 
on the notional interest rate.11  Specifically, they sug-
gest a formula that reduces the accrual rate of benefits 
and the indexation of benefits in payment not by the 
full decline in the balance ratio, but only by a fraction 
of the decline.  The effect is to attenuate the shock by 
lengthening the period of adjustment.  
The adjustment that is appropriate should depend 
on whether the problem is one of long-run sustain-
ability only, or whether there is also an immediate 
need to improve net cash flows.  The latter could 
occur when the funding ratio becomes low enough to 
call for significant immediate adjustment.  Without 
the need to maintain full funding, as with a corporate 
system, a cash-flow problem is possible, but is less 
likely in a national system with considerable auto-
matic adjustments and an adequate buffer stock of 
financial assets. 
In sum, the operation of the brake could be im-
proved – separately or in combination – in three ways:
1.  By applying the two-account mechanism to ac-
counts during buildup to avoid an unintended 
increase in accumulations.  
2.  By applying the balance ratio only to part of the 
wage growth rate for the purposes of indexing 
pensions in payment, thus giving retirees – who 
are more risk averse – relatively greater protection 
than workers. 
3.  By slowing down the operation of the brake along 
the lines suggested by Auerbach and Lee, thus 
reducing sharp impacts on retirees.Center for Retirement Research 6
Conclusion
Adherence to the defined contribution analogy in 
designing the brake for Sweden’s NDC plan places 
retirees more at risk than workers.  Reform should 
focus on the consequences rather than looking for an 
unduly close parallel to funded defined contribution 
systems.  Modest changes could make the system 
function more equitably.  And slowing down the 
operation of the brake could lessen sharp impacts on 
retirees.  
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